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VIOLATIONS ABOUND: THE CONTROL OF WATER
POLLUTION LIABILITY IN EQT PRODUCTION COMPANY V.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
OF THE COMMONWEALTH
I. INTRODUCTION
“I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river
Is a strong brown god—sullen, untamed and intractable,
Patient to some degree, at first recognised as a frontier;
Useful, untrustworthy, as a conveyor of commerce;
Then only a problem confronting the builder of bridges.”1
When T. S. Eliot composed these verses, it is unlikely he contemplated statutory stream pollution control.2 Eliot did manage to
identify a problem lying at the epicenter of stream pollution control, however, by recognizing the difficulty in taming the turbulent
nature of streams and rivers.3 In the context of environmental law,
remediating stream pollution can be formidable once contaminants enter into the water.4 To find a long-term solution, courts
must balance the public’s interest in restoring polluted waterways
back to their pristine states, while also levying consistent, predictable, and fair sanctions against polluting entities.5
1. T.S. ELIOT, The Dry Salvages, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 130, 130
(1971) (stating opening lines to “The Dry Salvages,” third poem in “The Four
Quartets”).
2. See Mark Latham et al., The Intersection of Tort and Environmental Law: Where
the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 738-39 (2011) (noting
powerful environmental statutes were “virtually non[-]existent” before 1970); PETER ACKROYD, T. S. ELIOT 262 (1984) (implying “The Dry Salvages” was written
before 1970 by stating Eliot sent draft of poem in January 1941).
3. See EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128, 1143 (Pa. 2018)
(noting EQT rejected theory of liability for contamination based on “passive movement of substances in the environment and the complexity of affected water
systems.”).
4. See id. (noting EQT emphasized difficulty of remediating passive migration
of contaminants in complex water systems); United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 98 F.
Supp. 2d 1031, 1038 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (discussing difficulty and expense of removing contaminants from river sediment).
5. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (discussing people’s right to clean environment
and Commonwealth’s duty to preserve such environment); 35 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 6026.102(3) (1989) (stating predictable and uniform cleanup standards are necessary in eliminating environmental hazards); EQT, 181 A.3d at 1147 (recognizing
need to protect environment from pollution and concluding General Assembly
did not intend clean water legislation to foster massive strict liability system).

(295)
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In EQT Production Company v. Department of Environmental Protection, the challenge in taming Eliot’s “strong brown god” came
before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.7 Previously, using Section
301 of the Clean Streams Law, Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) held polluters liable for the passive
migration of contaminants, in addition to their initial discharge,
into the environment.8 This authorized the DEP to charge additional “continuing violation[s]” when contaminants passively migrated from the soil into a waterway or entered a new discrete
waterway from an old one.9 In theory, this practice would encourage entities to remediate their own pollution quickly before
the contaminants travelled downstream.10 Despite the DEP’s encouragement, polluters encountered challenges in the technical aspects of pollution remediation, particularly when contaminants
entered turbulent waterways.11 EQT Production Company (EQT)
filed for declaratory judgment regarding the DEP’s reading of the
Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, fearing the current reading would
subject the company to countless pollution violations.12 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, held an entity does not
violate Section 301 when streams or rivers passively carry contaminants into new waterways.13
The ruling in EQT demonstrates the importance of providing
potential polluters with predictable sanctions regarding their con6

6. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1147 (discussing need for clean environment while
stressing need to limit liability for contamination).
7. Id. at 1130 (discussing basic factual background of case concerning pollution into Pennsylvania waterway); T.S. ELIOT, The Dry Salvages, in THE COMPLETE
POEMS AND PLAYS 130, 130 (1971) (describing river as “strong brown god”).
8. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1131-32 (explaining DEP’s soil-to-water and water-to-water
theories of violations of Clean Streams Law).
9. See id. at 1132 (explaining DEP’s continuing violation theory which permits
charging of additional violations once contaminants enter new discrete water).
10. See id. at 1151 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (suggesting Clean Streams Law
encourages polluters to limit flow of contaminants once contaminants enter
water); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection’s Reply Brief at 4, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa.
2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (arguing Clean Streams Law was intended to punish entity’s failure to take remedial steps).
11. See Brief for Appellee Eqt Production Company at 33, EQT Prod. Co. v.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (discussing difficulty in stopping passive flow of contaminants once polluters release them into
turbulent waters).
12. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1130-31 (stating litigation was result of EQT’s declaratory judgment proceeding and EQT’s concern for “unending civil liability”).
13. Id. at 1149 (stating majority’s holding in case).
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duct.14 This decision will provide manufacturing and drilling entities more predictability in their potential pollution liability and will
leave the DEP sufficient room to maneuver when drawing funds for
remediation.15 This Note discusses the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s ruling in EQT in the context of the DEP’s prior enforcement of the Clean Streams Law, as well as previous judicial review of
the DEP’s interpretation of that law.16 Additionally, this Note will
argue Section 301 of the Clean Streams Law, when contextualized
with other statutes that explicitly remediate pollution, only contemplates initial contaminant releases and not subsequent contaminant
movements.17 Part II provides detailed factual background of EQT
and the arguments advanced by both parties.18 Part III of this Note
describes the general practices of the DEP regarding pollution control and the acceptance of continuing violation theories in other
jurisdictions.19 Part IV outlines the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
reasoning in overruling the DEP’s reading and analyzes the decision through statutory purpose and interpretation.20 Finally, Part V
predicts the impact EQT will have over the DEP’s ability to remediate pollution and the future validity of other continuing violation
theories.21
II. FACTS
The departure from the DEP’s established Clean Streams Law
jurisprudence has its genesis in an otherwise unremarkable contaminant spill.22 In 2012, EQT, a fracking company, operated a drilling
14. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6026.102(3) (1989) (decreeing predictable and
uniform cleanup standards are necessary in eliminating environmental hazards).
15. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1148 (ruling in favor of EQT by rejecting continuing
violation charges for passive migration of contaminants while allowing DEP to raise
remediation funds through other Pennsylvania statutes).
16. For further discussion of DEP’s prior enforcement of Clean Streams Law
in Pennsylvania and its treatment of this enforcement by Pennsylvania courts, see
infra notes 50-74 and accompanying text.
17. For a further critique of the majority’s opinion and the dissent, see infra
notes 125-162 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the factual background of the case and arguments advanced by both parties, see infra notes 22-49 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the DEP’s prior enforcement of continuing
violation theories and the state of continuing violation theories in other jurisdictions, see infra notes 50-102 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the narrative overview and reasoning of both
majority and dissenting opinions along with a critical comparison between the two,
see infra notes 103-162 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion predicting the potential impact of EQT on both potential
polluters and the DEP, see infra notes 163-183 and accompanying text.
22. See EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128, 1130 (Pa. 2018)
(discussing leak from fracking impoundment which began litigation).
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station in Tioga County, Pennsylvania.23 Leaks from an impoundment containing fracking waste water resulted in pollution to the
surrounding soil and waterways.24 Anticipating enormous liability
under the DEP’s continuing violation reading of the Clean Streams
Law, EQT filed for a declaratory judgment proceeding.25 EQT expressed concern over the DEP’s “continuing violation” theory,
which would supposedly create liability as long as any contaminant
remained in the environment.26 According to EQT, this could lead
to potentially unending liability.27 EQT instead contended that
Section 301 violations only occurred on days they initially polluted
the water, and not on days when their contaminants existed in the
water or passively entered new waters.28
Shortly thereafter, the DEP filed a complaint against EQT with
the Environmental Hearing Board, seeking $4,532,296 in financial
sanctions.29 In justifying this sanction, the DEP largely relied on its

23. EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 153 A.3d 424, 426 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2017) (explaining EQT’s operations in Duncan Township). EQT Production
Company is a large fracking company that operates numerous wells in Marcellus
formations. See EQT Corp (EQT), REUTERS, (last visited Sept. 4, 2018), https://
www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/company-profile/EQT (discussing operations of
EQT Production Company). The Duncan Township operation at issue, which is
located in Tioga County, is a Marcellus formation well. See generally id. (noting
EQT’s wells in Pennsylvania are primarily Marcellus formation wells); PROFILES OF
PENNSYLVANIA 919 (David Garoogian ed., 4th ed. 2016) (providing profile of
Duncan Township and noting location within Tioga County).
24. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1130 (discussing leaks in EQT’s fracking equipment
which led to litigation). The parties disputed the exact factual details which led to
the case, but this was irrelevant to the court’s inquiry. Id. at 1130 n.2. It was undisputed that EQT polluted industrial waste into waters of the Commonwealth. Id.
Drillers create fracking waste water when the driller recaptures fracking fluid used
to create fractures in shale. See generally Kristen Allen, Comment, The Big Fracking
Deal: Marcellus Shale—Pennsylvania’s Untapped Re$ource, 23 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 5658 (2012) (describing fracking process).
25. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1130 (discussing EQT’s lawsuit in attempt to avoid massive liability).
26. Id. at 1130-31 (explaining EQT’s concerns over DEP’s Clean Streams Law
jurisprudence). EQT noted the difficulty of removing every single contaminant
polluted from the waters and referenced the ability of modern technology to detect miniscule contaminant concentrations. Id. at 1143.
27. Id. (discussing EQT’s fear of unlimited liability considering complete
remediation of all contaminants would be nearly impossible and DEP would
charge violations even for failure to remediate miniscule amounts of
contaminants).
28. See id. (stating view that DEP’s soil-to-water theory contradicted plain language of governing law, Clean Streams Law jurisprudence, and General Assembly’s
legislative intent).
29. See id. (explaining DEP’s filing of civil penalty complaint against EQT for
2012 Duncan Township fracking pollution).
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continuing violation theory of the Clean Streams Law.30 In a motion opposing EQT’s injunction for declaratory relief, the DEP affirmed its continuing violation theory by arguing subsequent
violations occurred if contaminants passively traveled between every
new discrete body of water (the “water-to-water” theory) and also by
passively migrating from soil to water (the “soil-to-water” theory).31
EQT subsequently applied for summary relief and petitioned the
court for two pronouncements.32 First, EQT asked the court to declare that violations occur only when a person or entity allows contaminants enter waters of the Commonwealth.33 Second, EQT
asserted the mere presence of contaminants in the waters of the
Commonwealth does not constitute a violation of the Clean
Streams Law.34
When the DEP replied that EQT’s requested pronouncements
did not address the DEP’s soil-to-water and water-to-water continuing violation theories, EQT refocused explicitly on the water-towater theory.35 EQT argued the water-to-water theory, if executed
to the full extent, would lead to absurd consequences.36 Specifically, EQT contended that, under the DEP’s interpretation, one
spill would lead to perpetual liability because it is practically impossible to remove every microscopic particle from the spill.37 More
broadly, an entity who polluted a lake or one long river with no
tributaries would receive only one violation per day, whereas an entity who polluted a river with numerous tributaries would be liable
for unlimited consequences.38 Additionally, according to EQT,
there was no neutral system to restrain these potentially unlimited
30. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1131 (discussing DEP’s reasons for seeking damage
amount).
31. See id. at 1131-32 (discussing DEP’s two continuing violation theories).
32. Id. at 1132 (discussing EQT’s attempt to resolve case).
33. Id. (discussing EQT’s first argument on appeal).
34. Id. (discussing EQT’s second argument on appeal).
35. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1134 (discussing DEP’s argument that EQT’s did not
address DEP’s legal theories and EQT’s subsequent refocusing of issues).
36. See id. at 1143 (stating EQT’s concerns over DEP charging violations for
passive conduct); Brief for Appellee Eqt Production Company at 31, EQT Prod.
Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2018), (No. 6 MAP 2017) (arguing
DEP’s interpretation of Clean Streams Law is “absurd”).
37. EQT at 181 A.3d at 1131 (arguing liability under Clean Streams Law using
DEP’s reading would never end because removing all contaminants from environment is practically impossible).
38. Id. at 1142 (discussing difficulty of determining exactly where one water
body ends and another begins); Brief for Appellee Eqt Production Company at 31,
EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017)
(using examples of real-life tributaries to bolster argument regarding absurdity of
DEP’s interpretation).
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sanctions the DEP levied — the DEP’s discretion was the only force
placing a limit on the potentially boundless sanctions.39 Finally,
EQT advanced a unitary waters theory in the context of the Clean
Streams Law, which, if adopted by the court, would treat all waters
in the Commonwealth as “a collective group of waters” and effectively invalidate the DEP’s water-to-water theory.40
For its part, the DEP insisted the continuing violation theory
promoted one of the purposes of the Clean Streams Law — restoring polluted waters back to their natural state.41 The water-to-water
continuing violation theory would thus encourage entities to rapidly remediate their pollution after a spill.42 The DEP also asserted
the plain language of “into” supported the theory, as the phrase
“one stream falls or runs into another” contemplates passive movement.43 Rebutting EQT’s fear of potentially unlimited liability, the
DEP suggested the difficulty in linking downstream contaminants
39. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1143 (arguing DEP holds polluters at mercy of DEP
because DEP’s reading has no limiting principle); Brief for Appellee Eqt Production Company at 28-31, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa.
2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (expressing concerns over lack of control regarding
DEP’s continuing violation theory).
40. EQT at 181 A.3d at 1142 (arguing Clean Streams Law refers to Commonwealth’s waters as one instead of discrete bodies of water). EQT argued the phrase
“any of the waters” found in the Clean Streams Law implies the statute views the
waters as a collective rather than a collection of discrete water bodies. Id.; but see
Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308, 315 (Pa. 1973) (implying by
court’s holding that Clean Streams Law views waters individually and not
collectively).
41. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1141 (stating statutory purposes bolsters DEP’s reading
of Clean Streams Law); see 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691.4(3) (1989) (stating remedial
purpose of Clean Streams Law as preventing new pollution and reclaiming polluted waters to non-polluted state); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department
of Environmental Protection’s Reply Brief at 20-23, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2018), (No. 6 MAP 2017) (invoking statutory purpose to support DEP’s reading).
42. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection’s Reply Brief at 22, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128
(Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (suggesting entities would be more likely to remediate their own pollution under DEP’s water-to-water continuing violation theory).
43. See id. at 5 (arguing plain language meaning of preposition “into” supports DEP’s continuing violation water-to-water theory). As noted by the DEP and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the dictionary definition of the word “into” displays the example of “one stream falls or runs into another.” EQT, 181 A.3d at
1145; Definition of Into, WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.webster-dictionary.net/
definition/into (last visited Sept. 22, 2018) (providing examples of word “into”).
The version the parties and the court used was actually an unofficial online compilation of several old public domain dictionaries, but an inquiry into an official
Webster’s Dictionary yields a similar result. See About, WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http:/
/www.webster-dictionary.net/about.htm, (last visited Sept. 22, 2018) (describing
website as combination of 1913 Webster’s Dictionary and work submitted by volunteers); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1184 (William Babcock
Grove ed. et al. 2002) (providing example of “the river ran [into] the sea”).
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to the upstream polluter acts as an adequate safeguard.44 The DEP
argued the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Harmar Coal, which involved the active transfer of waters, rejected EQT’s unitary waters
theory.45 The DEP further used Harmar Coal’s rejection of the idea
that “pollution occurs [only] when polluting substances are ‘[first]
discharged into [any] waters of the Commonwealth’” to bolster the
water-to-water theory.46
In its review of the issue, the Commonwealth Court rejected
the DEP’s water-to-water theory, declaring that the General Assembly did not intend to create such a massive liability system based
upon passive conduct.47 The DEP proceeded to appeal the judgment to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.48 In a 5-2 decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s
judgment.49
III. BACKGROUND
In 1937, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the Clean
Streams Law.50 The Clean Streams Law aims to protect the waters
of Pennsylvania.51 Section 301 of the statute forbids an entity from
placing, “continu[ing] to discharge[,] or permit[ting] to flow” an
industrial waste “into” the waters of the Commonwealth.52 The
44. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1142 (arguing safeguard exists because DEP has burden of proof to link contaminant to violator).
45. See id. at 1140 (suggesting Harmar Coal contemplated discrete waters
rather than waters as one collective).
46. See id. (arguing Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously rejected EQT’s
criticism of water-to-water theory in Harmar Coal); Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal
Co., 306 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa. 1973) (implying pollution may occur after contaminants have entered water).
47. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1135-36 (discussing Commonwealth Court’s reasoning
in siding with EQT’s Clean Streams Law jurisprudence).
48. See id. at 1129 (stating DEP appealed Commonwealth Court’s judgment).
49. Id. at 1149 (declaring affirmation of Commonwealth Court’s holding).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also ruled on certain sua sponte aspects of the
Commonwealth Court’s analysis. See id. at 1138-39; EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 153 A.3d 424, 433-34 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (defining term “discharge” based upon independent formulation not argued by parties). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court unanimously ruled to vacate those portions of the analysis.
EQT, 181 A.3d at 1139 (holding Commonwealth Court overstepped its authority
regarding sua sponte holdings by independently formulating interpretation of
Clean Streams Law).
50. 1976 Pa. Laws 1099 (stating Clean Streams Law was approved June 22
1937).
51. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691.4 (1989) (stating purpose of Clean Streams
Law).
52. See id. § 691.301 (discussing prohibitions against discharge of industrial
wastes). Section 301 of the Clean Streams Law states in full, “No person or municipality shall place or permit to be placed, or discharged or permit to flow, or con-
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Clean Streams Law grants the DEP authority to prevent the pollution of the Commonwealth’s waters, which are broadly defined as
“any and all rivers, streams, [and] creeks . . . within or on the
boundaries of this Commonwealth.”53 Section 605 addresses the
civil penalties for violations, with each discrete violation carrying a
fine of up to $10,000 per day.54 The Clean Streams Law serves not
only to prevent new pollution, but also to restore polluted waters to
their natural, unpolluted state.55 The Clean Streams Law is one of
many pollution control statutes governing the Commonwealth and
frequently acts in tandem with other environmental statutes to provide Pennsylvanians with their constitutional entitlement to a clean
environment.56
A. Testing the Contaminated Waters: Prior Use of Continuing
Violations in Enforcing the Clean Streams Law
In order to maximize the civil penalties assessed against polluters, the DEP has broadly interpreted the Clean Streams Law.57
Since the 1970s, the DEP charged violations when polluters initially
discharged a contaminant into a stream and again when that contaminant traveled from one stream to another.58 For example, if
tinue to discharge or permit to flow, into any of the waters of the Commonwealth
any industrial wastes, except as hereinafter provided in this act.” Id.
53. Id. § 691.1 (defining term “waters of the Commonwealth.”)
54. Id. § 691.605(a) (stating civil penalties assessed may be up to $10,000 for
each day of violation).
55. Id. § 691.4(3) (stating purpose of the Clean Streams Law); see John C.
Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part II- Environmental Rights and Public Trust 104 DICK. L. REV. 97, 156-58
(1999) (describing purpose of Clean Streams Law as elimination of current and
future water pollution)
56. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating Pennsylvania citizens have constitutional
right to clean environment); Edward R. Paul & Michael J. Shepard, Statutory Pollution Control in Pennsylvania, 16 VILL. L. REV. 851, 890 (1971) (noting statutes other
than Clean Streams Law DEP may use to remediate water pollution).
57. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection’s Reply Brief at 2, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128
(Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (stating DEP’s undisputed Clean Streams Law interpretation since 1970s).
58. See id. (discussing DEP’s prior implementation and position regarding
continuing violation theory). See, e.g., Department’s Response Memorandum of
Law to Norfolk Southern’s Motion and Supporting Memorandum of Law for Partial Summary Judgment to Strike the Department’s Imposition of Pre-calculated
Daily Civil Penalties for Prospective Violations of Law at 3-4, Norfolk S. Corp. v.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 27, 2007) (No. 2006-229-CP-R)
(alleging ongoing damages of $46,420 per day using Clean Streams Law and
$3,475,000 using Solid Waste Management Act and Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act).
But see Brief for Appellee Eqt Production Company at 47-48, EQT Prod. Co. v.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (describing
DEP’s water-to-water continuing violation reading as “novel”).
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contaminants from one spill entered two different streams, the DEP
would charge two violations per day instead of one.59 The DEP also
enforced penalties against those who pollute soil with contaminants, which later passively migrate through the soil and into any
waters of the Commonwealth.60 The DEP used these interpretations, otherwise known as “continuing violation” theories, to levy
large penalties for short but disastrous environmental accidents and
grant them necessary funds for expensive clean-ups.61 For example, Norfolk Southern Railway Company polluted water with large
amounts of sodium hydroxide in a one-day spill, and the stream
eventually carried the contaminants into other waterways.62 Partially due to continuing violation readings, the DEP and Norfolk
Southern reached a $7,350,000 settlement agreement.63
Until recently, neither the Commonwealth Court nor the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly ruled on the validity of continuing violation readings, but both lent vague support.64 In 1998’s
Westinghouse Electric Co. v. DEP,65 an elevator manufacturer leaked
chemicals into the environment over a period of several years.66
59. See Department of Environmental Protection’s Reply Brief at 1, EQT
Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017)
(explaining DEP’s Clean Streams Law liability theory).
60. See EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128, 1131-32 (Pa.
2018) (describing DEP’s soil-to-water reading of Clean Streams Law).
61. See id. at 1141 (discussing how DEP’s interpretation of Clean Streams Law
facilitates its enforcement).
62. 37 PA. BULL. 6340 (Dec. 1, 2007) (discussing facts surrounding 2006 McKean County train derailment incident); 38 PA. BULL. 939 (Feb. 16, 2008) (noting
proposed settlement agreement was accepted by Norfolk Southern); Brief for
Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant
at 7, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP
2017) (discussing real-life application of continuing violation theory).
63. Brief for Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 8, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128
(Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (discussing sanction imposed partly using the continuing violation theory). The DEP also used the Solid Waste Management Act and
the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, among other environmental statutes, to impose
the fine. 37 PA. BULL. 6340 (Dec., 1 2007) (noting proposed settlement agreement
with damages based upon Solid Waste Management Act and Hazardous Sites
Cleanup Act in addition to Clean Streams Law); 38 PA. BULL. 939 (Feb. 16, 2008)
(noting Norfolk Southern accepted proposed settlement agreement).
64. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp v. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 705 A.2d
1349, 1356 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (charging violations only in initial discharges
and not mere existence of contaminants).
65. Id. at 1356 (holding sufficient evidence of link between entity and “illegal
discharge” of contaminant into water must be present to impose sanctions under
Clean Streams Law).
66. Id. at 1350-51 (discussing pollution caused by elevator manufacturing
plant over period of seven years). The contaminants polluted were degreasers trichloroethylene and 1,1,1–trichloroethane. Id. at 1350. Exposure to these contaminants may lead to heart, liver, and kidney defects. Id.
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The same type of chemicals were later found in over sixty nearby
residential wells.67 Despite this, the Commonwealth Court found
the defendant polluter liable for only two discharges because there
was insufficient evidence to link the chemicals found in all the wells
to the initial discharges.68 The court indicated the alleged polluter
would be liable for this continuing violation, however, had the contaminants been sufficiently linked to the initial discharges.69
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also lent possible support for
the continuing violation reading in Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal
Co.70 Harmar Coal involved a coal mine operator who wished to discharge contaminants from an adjacent abandoned mine into the
Commonwealth’s waters without first treating the discharges.71 The
Commonwealth Court theorized, in part, that the water in the
abandoned mine was not controlled by the Clean Streams Law because the polluted water had already existed in the environment.72
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the Commonwealth
Court’s theory that “pollution occurs [o]nly when polluting substances are ‘first discharged into [a]ny “waters of the Commonwealth.”‘“73 The Supreme Court disclaimed the Commonwealth
67. Id. (discussing DEP’s discovery of degreasers trichloroethylene and 1,1,1trichloroethane in nearby water supply and nearby residential wells).
68. See id. at 1356 (holding defendant could not be held liable for presence of
contaminants in all nearby wells because there was insufficient evidence linking
existing pollution to Westinghouse manufacturing plant). Below the Commonwealth Court, the Environmental Hearing Board found the DEP failed to provide
specific proof of alleged leaking outside of two releases. Id. at 1352.
69. See Westinghouse, 705 A.2d at 1356 (stating court would have calculated
other wells into damages had there been sufficient link between pollution in
nearby wells and defendant’s initial discharges).
70. See Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308, 315 (Pa. 1973)
(suggesting support for continuing violation theory).
71. Id. at 311–12 (discussing facts of Pittsburgh Coal Company’s application
for mine drainage permit). Harmar Coal involved two similar Commonwealth
Court cases consolidated into one for appeal to the Supreme Court. See id.
(describing consolidation of Harmar Coal Company’s and Pittsburgh Coal Company’s review for permit). Regarding the continuing violation theory, the Pittsburgh Coal Company case is more applicable, as the Court’s reasoning could be
construed to favor a continuing violation theory of the Clean Streams Law. See id.
at 315 (rejecting Commonwealth Court’s rationale in granting Pittsburgh Coal
Company mine drainage permit because pollution does not only occur on initial
discharges).
72. Id. at 314 (discussing Commonwealth Court’s reasoning in granting Pittsburgh Coal Company mine drainage permit). The Commonwealth Court also
held the water transferred did not constitute an “industrial waste” under the Clean
Streams Law because the waste pre-existed Pittsburgh Coal Company’s mining operation. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court similarly overturned this holding.
Id. at 315.
73. Id. at 315 (stating reasoning for reversing Commonwealth Court’s decision that granted Pittsburgh Mining Company mine drainage permit).
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Court’s reasoning based on sections of the Clean Streams Law involving active mine drainage, concluding it was “illogical to limit
the meaning of ‘discharge from the mine’ to ‘drainage discharged
from the mine being worked.’”74
B. Continuing Violations in Other Jurisdictions
Although not all jurisdictions have uniform clean water legislation, each jurisdiction’s clean water legislation generally contain
similar verbiage.75 Courts construe the federal counterpart to
Pennsylvania’s Clean Streams Law, the Clean Water Act (CWA), to
disfavor a continuing violation theory.76 The United States Supreme Court first addressed this issue in 2004 with South Florida
Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians.77 In Miccosukee, a governmental agency pumped contaminated water from a
canal into a nearby reservoir.78 The legal issue before the Court
was whether this transfer constituted a “discharge of a pollutant”
that would require a NPDES permit.79 The Supreme Court concluded that further factual development was needed in order to resolve the question of whether the canal and reservoir were distinct
bodies of water, and in doing so, analogized this dispute with a pot
of soup.80 Quoting the Second Circuit, Justice O’Connor noted
that “[i]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot,
and pours it back into the pot, one has not ‘added’ soup or any-

74. See id. at 313, 315 (discussing Sections 307 and 315 of Clean Streams Law
and rejecting Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Section 315).
75. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012) (prohibiting “discharge” of pollutants); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691.301 (1989) (restricting “discharge” of industrial
waste “into” Pennsylvania waters); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5 (1987)
(prohibiting “discharge” of toxic chemicals “into” specified water or land).
76. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95, 105 (2004)
(ruling against continuing violation theory in one context); Friends of Everglades
v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. 570 F.3d 1210, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding
EPA’s adoption of unitary waters theory is reasonable and permissible construction
of Clean Water Act).
77. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105-06 (addressing continuing violation theory).
78. Id. at 99-102 (describing water pumping procedure at issue).
79. Id. at 102-03 (outlining legal dispute in case and lower courts’ ruling on
matter). NPDES permits are required of entities who discharge contaminants to
limit quantity of contaminants in the environment. Id. at 103
80. Id. at 110, 112 (discussing factual disputes and using soup analogy to elucidate CWA). The Supreme Court overruled the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmation of
summary judgment due to a factual dispute concerning the relationship between
the reservoir and the canal. Id. at 110. The quantity of water that flowed between
the two via groundwater was disputed. Id.
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thing else to the pot.”81 Therefore, violations of the CWA only occur if the transfer is between “meaningfully distinct water bodies.”82
By requiring the transfer to occur between “meaningfully distinct
water bodies,” the Supreme Court implicitly rejected a continuing
violation theory because such a theory charges violations for transfers between water bodies that are not “meaningfully distinct.”83
The Miccosukee Court failed to adopt or reject a unitary waters
theory, which, under the CWA, would treat all of the waters in the
United States as one body.84 In the context of pollution, the unitary waters theory dictates that the transfer of one contaminant
from one body of water into another, through active or passive
means, does not constitute an additional violation because the contaminant already existed within the navigable waters of the United
States.85 Although the Supreme Court has not decided the issue,
most circuit courts have rejected the unitary waters theory, even
when the EPA has advanced it.86 The First Circuit, for example,
81. Id. (quoting Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New
York, 273 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing soup analogy to illustrate what is
and is not Miccosukee Tribe’s argument).
82. See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 112 (remanding case to determine whether
water bodies were “meaningfully distinct”); see also L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 568 U.S. 78, 83 (2013) (stating Court in Miccosukee
held transfers of water do not constitute violations of Clean Water Act if between
“two parts of the same water body.”).
83. See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 112 (requiring transfer to be between “meaningfully distinct” water bodies for CWA violation); EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot., 181 A.3d 1128, 1132 (Pa. 2018) (stating Clean Streams Law violations occur
when contaminants passively spread to water bodies). The Supreme Court suggested passive flow between two water bodies would render them not “meaningfully distinct.” Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 110 (stating “significant mingling” of two
waters could render them indistinct). Hence the DEP’s water-to-water theory
could not comport with a “meaningfully distinct” requirement. EQT, 181 A.3d at
1132 (explaining DEP’s water-to-water theory as charging violations for passive migrations of contaminants in new water bodies).
84. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 109 (declining to resolve unitary waters theory because not all parties had addressed the theory before lower courts and in their
briefs); but see id. at 112-13 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting unitary waters theory was briefed adequately to render judgment on
it).
85. See James H. Andreasen, Still Defining “Discharge of a Pollutant” After Thirty
Years, 24-SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 52, 54 (2010) (explaining unitary waters
theory).
86. See, e.g., Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1297 (1st Cir. 1996)
(rejecting unitary waters theory); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited,
Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 491 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding transfer of
water between water bodies constitutes “discharge”); Friends of the Everglades v. S.
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating unitary waters
theory has “a low batting average” and has “struck out” when raised in other circuits). Courts grant deference to the EPA and other executive agencies regarding
issues of statutory interpretation when a statute is ambiguous. See Chevron, U.S.A.,
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held such a theory would lead to “irrational result[s]” that would
defy Congressional intent by legalizing unpermitted pollution of
pristine water bodies.87 In Friends of The Everglades v. South Florida
Water Management District, the Eleventh Circuit became the only circuit to adopt the unitary waters theory.88 Finding the CWA ambiguous with the singular term “any navigable water” and possibly plural
term “navigable waters,” the Friends court decided the unitary waters theory was a reasonable interpretation.89
Regarding passive transfers, some federal district courts have
validated soil-to-water CWA continuing violations when contaminants were polluted into sediment.90 The Fourth Circuit charged
continuing passive violations of the CWA in Sasser v. EPA.91 In
Sasser, a landowner began unpermitted construction on wetlands.92
When the Army Corps of Engineers discovered the construction,
the Corps ordered the landowner to stop construction to remediate
his error.93 The landowner apparently halted construction but refused to dismantle his progress on the project.94 Finding continuing violations of the CWA, the Fourth circuit asserted that “[e]ach
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837-38 (1984) (holding if Congress has not explicitly instructed agency on portion of statute agency administers
then legal issue is whether agency’s interpretation is reasonable and permissible).
87. Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1297 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting unitary waters theory
because it allows for transferring water between polluted water bodies and pristine
water bodies).
88. Friends, 570 F.3d at 1228 (accepting EPA’s promulgation of unitary waters
theory in regulation).
89. Id. at 1227 (finding unitary waters theory of Clean Water Act reasonable).
Before the Eleventh Circuit in Friends, the EPA was the proponent of the unitary
waters theory. Friends, 570 F.3d at 1213 (noting EPA supported unitary waters theory). Once the court found the statute ambiguous, the court gave Chevron deference to the EPA’s interpretation. Id. at 1227 (finding statute ambiguous regarding
continuing violations for transfers between two water bodies). In finding the
EPA’s interpretation to be reasonable, it was one of two reasonable interpretations
of the Clean Water Act and therefore could not be considered contrary to the law.
See id. at 1228 (using marble analogy to state EPA’s construction of Clean Streams
Law is reasonable). Compare Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308,
315 (Pa. 1973) (charging additional violations of clean water legislation when entity pollutes pristine water with contaminated water already in environment).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1038-39 (N.D.
Ind. 2000) (holding entity liable for continued violations of CWA when sediment
was polluted).
91. Sasser v. Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 990 F.2d 127, 129 (4th
Cir. 1993) (charging continuing violations for passive conduct when landowner
refuses to dismantle construction on wetlands).
92. See id. at 128 (describing Sasser’s construction on former rice fields).
93. See id. (describing Corps of Engineer’s discovery of Sasser’s construction
and EPA’s subsequent involvement).
94. See id. (discussing Sasser’s refusal to comply with EPA remediation order).
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day the pollutant remains in the wetlands without a permit constitutes an additional day of violation.”95
Outside of the federal government, one California appellate
court has addressed continuing violations in Consumer Advocacy
Group, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.96 In Consumer Advocacy Grp., a consumer group found contaminants in areas where Exxon Mobil had
once operated gas stations.97 The statute of limitations for a traditional action had expired because Exxon Mobil had not operated a
gas station in the any of the polluted areas for at least four years.98
This forced the consumer group to proceed upon a novel passive
migration theory, specifically, the ongoing passive migration of the
contaminants from the soil into the war constituted new violations.99 The case involved the interpretation of a voter ballot initiative containing the terms “discharge” and “release.”100 To
determine the meaning of these terms, the court examined the dictionary definition of the words and explanatory material in the
voter ballot pamphlet given to voters on Election Day.101 The court

95. Id. at 129 (holding CWA violations occur each day contaminants remain
in waterway).
96. Consumer Advocacy Grp. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 454,
456-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (addressing continuing violation theory stemming
from contaminants’ passive migration).
97. See id. (stating Exxon once operated gas stations at polluted sites).
98. See id. at 456 (explaining Exxon’s gas operations in areas of issue).
99. Id. at 457 (explaining plaintiffs had to proceed on passive migration theory because statute of limitations prevented more conventional approach). The
plaintiffs argued that the passive movement from soil into water or water into water
constituted a new violation of California’s Clean Streams Law analog. See id. at 45657 (arguing how passive migration of contaminants allegedly left by Exxon constituted additional violations of California’s clean water legislation). This would circumvent the statute of limitations. Id.
100. Id. at 458 (discussing voter ballot initiative’s wording). See CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 25249.5 (1987) (containing words “discharge” and “release”).
The Consumer Advocacy Grp. court referred to the voter ballot initiative as “Proposition 65.” See Consumer Advocacy Grp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 456 (discussing electorate’s passage of Proposition 65).
101. See Consumer Advocacy Grp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 458-59 (discussing dictionary definitions of words and material found in voter pamphlet). The court
noted that frequent definitions of “discharge” and “release” include “setting free”
and “free[ing] from anything that restrains or fastens.” Id. (using dictionaries to
ascertain meaning of ambiguous wording of Proposition 65). The voter ballot initiative pamphlet stated the initiative would “stop [companies from] dumping extremely dangerous chemicals into your drinking water” and “appl[ies] only to
businesses that know” they are polluting. Id. at 459 (emphasis removed) (using
ballot arguments for Proposition 65 and rebuttals to arguments against Proposition 65 to determine meaning of Proposition 65).
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used this analysis in holding the terms refer to “a movement of
chemicals from a confined space into the land or the water.”102
IV. THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT INTRODUCES FAIRNESS
AND PREDICTABILITY TO STREAM POLLUTION LIABILITY IN EQT
A. Narrative Analysis
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began with the apparent ambiguity of the Clean Streams Law.103 Noting the broad terms “discharge” and “permit to flow” potentially overlap and do not
explicitly address passive movement, the court looked to judicial
analysis of similar statutes in other jurisdictions.104 In particular,
the court examined the California Court of Appeal for the Second
District’s reading in Consumer Advocacy Group v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
which held the phrases “discharge” and “release” imply a release
from confinement.105 The court found this to be the “natural reading” of the Clean Streams Law and concluded using the terms “discharge” and “release” to describe passive movement would be a
“less natural” reading of the statute.106
Following this analysis, the majority then described the dilemma it experienced while interpreting the ambiguous word
“into.”107 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated the word “into”
could be logically read to contemplate active and passive movement, like one body of water naturally falling into another.108 Disclaiming EQT’s suggestion, the court reasoned the Clean Streams
Law did not imply a unitary waters theory by using the phrase “any
waters of the Commonwealth” instead of “any water,” as the phrase
102. Id. at 463 (holding voter ballot initiative applies to active not passive discharges); see also N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Dimant, 51 A.3d 816, 831-32 (N.J.
2012) (holding term “discharge” when referring to damages requires nexus between contaminant’s existence in environment and polluter); contra Power Test
Realty Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Coit, 134 A.3d 1213, 1221 (R.I. 2016) (holding term
“discharge” may include passive leaching of contaminant).
103. EQT v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128, 1144 (Pa. 2018) (stating
Clean Streams Law is ambiguous regarding “ongoing migration of previously-released contaminants among the waters of the Commonwealth and their many
parts.”).
104. Id. (noting broad terms in Clean Streams Law provide little judicial guidance in interpretation).
105. See id. (noting reading of “discharge” and “release” in Consumer Advocacy
Grp.).
106. Id. (describing reading of words “release” and “discharge” found in Consumer Advocacy Grp. more “natural” than DEP’s interpretation).
107. Id. at 1145 (describing ambiguity surrounding word “into” in context of
Clean Streams Law).
108. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1145 (stating word “into” may contemplate passive
movement).
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“any waters” was later defined in another section of the statute to
encompass individual waters.109 The court also noted the plain
meaning of “into” does not necessarily refer specifically to direct or
indirect release into water.110 This analysis led the court to hold
the plain reading of the statute did not completely rebut the DEP’s
water-to-water reading.111
This left the court with the challenging task of discerning the
General Assembly’s intent regarding the meaning of the ambiguous
phrases.112 Relying on its prior finding that the California appellate
court’s reading of a similar statute constituted the “most natural
reading,” the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the Clean Streams
Law only applied to initial discharges.113 The court concluded the
General Assembly would have explicitly codified the water-to-water
theory if it had intended incorporate this strict liability system into
the Clean Streams Law.114 Specifically, the General Assembly could
have easily accomplished this by forbidding the movement of contaminants “into or among” the waters of the Commonwealth rather
than only the movement of contaminants “into” the waters of the
Commonwealth.115 While acknowledging the Clean Stream Law’s
purpose is to promote “the constitutional entitlement of the citizenry to a clean environment,” the court could not justify enforcing
the potent water-to-water theory on mere inferences.116
After examining the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s prior ruling in Harmar Coal, the court stated the case was inapplicable to
passive contaminant movement.117 Although the opinion contained language that may have supported the DEP’s continuing violation interpretation, the Harmar Coal court considered active

109. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691.1 (1989) (defining term “waters of the Commonwealth” to contemplate individual waters); EQT, 181 A.3d at 1146 (disagreeing
with EQT’s argument that all waters in Commonwealth are one body).
110. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1146 (stating word “into” can be “read to carry
passive connotations.”).
111. Id. (rejecting EQT’s argument that plain meaning of statute fully supports its position).
112. See id. (stating General Assembly used “broad terms and phrases” when it
prohibited release of industrial waste into Pennsylvania waters”).
113. Id. at 1146 (holding Clean Streams Law only applies in initial
discharges).
114. See id. at 1147 (dismissing water-to-water theory of Clean Streams Law).
115. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1147 (stating how General Assembly could have crafted
Clean Streams Law with water-to-water continuing violation system).
116. See id. (acknowledging importance of remediation and Clean Streams
Law despite holding).
117. Id. at 1148 (stating Harmar Coal was not controlling in present case).
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conduct, as opposed to passive conduct.118 Reiterating the decision’s focus on Section 301 of the Clean Streams Law, the court
stated the decision would not affect other efficacious environmental remediation measures.119 Moreover, the court declined to evaluate the soil-to-water continuing violation theory because it was not
argued sufficiently before them.120
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Donohue disagreed that the
Consumer Advocacy Grp. court’s interpretation was the most natural
reading of the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law.121 Justice Donohue noted the Consumer Advocacy Grp. court’s interpretation was
based on voter information pamphlets specific to that California
initiative, as opposed to the language of a relevant statute.122 Furthermore, Justice Donohue suggested that even if the Consumer Advocacy Grp. initiative had a similar origin, the Consumer Advocacy Grp.
reading conflicted with the passive “continu[ing] . . . to permit to
flow” language within the Clean Streams Law.123 Justice Donohue
ultimately concluded the “common and approved usage of the [relevant] words” in the Clean Streams Law suggests the law intended
to protect all waters of the Commonwealth and the water-to-water
theory was, therefore, a permissible reading.124

118. See id. (noting differences between Harmar Coal and present case). The
court noted that Harmar Coal considered a permit application for the pumping of
mine drainage from contained coal mine bases into surface waters, whereas EQT
dealt with “instances of contaminants moving from uncontained parts of waters
into other parts of waters.” Id.
119. See id. (describing other avenues of remediation available to DEP); Paul
& Shepard, supra note 56, at 890 (noting around time of environmental statute
proliferation that DEP may use statutes other than Clean Streams Law to remediate water pollution). See also PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating Pennsylvania citizens
have constitutional right to clean environment).
120. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1149 (declining to address soil-to-water theory). The
court noted the soil-to-water theory would be considered in the Commonwealth
Court’s forthcoming review of the EHB’s penalty determination. Id.
121. Id. at 1151 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s use of
Consumer Advocacy Group in their analysis).
122. See id. (Donohue, J., dissenting) (describing differences between Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law and California voter ballot initiative).
123. Id. at 1152 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (stating conflict between majority’s
reading and phrase “continu[ing] . . . to permit to flow” found in Pennsylvania
Clean Streams Law).
124. See id. at 1152-53 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (discussing language of Clean
Streams Law and conclusion drawn from such language). Justice Donohue also
stated the court failed to acknowledge a 2016 Rhode Island case which treated
Consumer Advocacy Group unfavorably. Id. at 1151 n.3.
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B. Critical Analysis: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Introduces
Fairness and Predictability in EQT
By refusing to infer a massive strict liability system from vague
statutory text, the majority rescued potential polluters from a regulatory Sword of Damocles.125 The dissent read the “continu[ing]
. . . to permit to flow” language of the Clean Streams Law narrowly
without acknowledging an alternative and more active connotation
of the phrase.126 Although the “continu[ing] . . . to permit to flow”
language may be read as permitting contaminants to flow freely
through the Commonwealth’s waters, the phrase could also contemplate a refusal to take rudimentary remedial steps.127 Instead of
construing the phrase as permitting contaminants to flow outside of
the entity’s effective control, the “continu[ing] . . . to permit to
flow” language may be read as permitting a leak from a place of
containment to continue to flow into the environment.128 Such an
interpretation would be consistent with the other more active
phrases of the Clean Streams Law and favored by traditional principles of statutory interpretation.129
Notably, Justice Donohue’s dissent did catch errors made in
the majority’s reasoning.130 In particular, the almost bare reliance
on the Consumer Advocacy Grp. decision in determining the “most
natural” reading of the statute is questionable, considering the California appellate court undertook an analysis unique to the Califor-

125. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1147 (stating General Assembly would have made
massive liability system in Clean Streams Law more explicit if it intended to create
such system).
126. See id. at 1152 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (stating “continu[ing] . . . to
permit to flow” language contemplates passive conduct and conflicts with majority’s analysis).
127. Id. at 1150-51 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that ambiguity remains over language in Clean Streams Law).
128. Id. at 1145 (holding natural definition of term “release” contemplates
initial release of contaminants and not later passive migration).
129. See id. at 1146 (finding Clean Streams Law to be ambiguous). See also S.
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95, 110 (2004) (using soup
analogy to demonstrate relevant matter at issue). See generally Yates v. United
States, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015) (describing statutory interpretation principle
noscitur a sociis as “a word is known by the company it keeps”). The Supreme Court
noted the principle “noscitur a sociis” is to “avoid ascribing to one word a meaning
so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the [relevant law].” Id. (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513
U.S. 561, 575 (1995)).
130. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1151 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (stating that majority’s
bare reliance on Consumer Advocacy Group in determining “most natural” reading of
statute was misplaced).
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nia voter ballot initiative.131 In determining the phrases
“discharge” and “release” concerned the movement from a place of
confinement to no confinement, the Consumer Advocacy Grp. court
was largely guided by voter pamphlets given to voters at polling locations.132 Unlike the EQT court, the Consumer Advocacy Grp. court
did not rest their interpretation simply on it being the “most natural” reading and did not refer to the public interest group’s reading
as “less natural.”133 If the EQT majority followed a similar analysis
by analyzing the legislative history and statutory purpose of the
Clean Streams Law, then reliance on Consumer Advocacy Grp. would
be more appropriate.134 The majority’s decision that the Consumer
Advocacy Grp. reading was “most natural” instead rested on a discussion of unsupported, broad perceptions of the word “release.”135
Such analysis does not withstand Justice Donohue’s criticism.136
In order to explain precisely why the Consumer Advocacy Grp.
court’s interpretation of the California voter ballot initiative is also
the “most natural” interpretation of the Pennsylvania Clean
Streams Law, one must examine areas not explicitly discussed in the
majority opinion.137 The most obvious analysis to undergo is analogous to the path the Consumer Advocacy Grp. court travelled — examining statutory purpose and history.138 As the DEP noted in
argument, the Clean Streams Law’s general purpose is not only to
prevent additional pollution, but also to return polluted streams to
their natural state.139 Although this may improve Justice Dono131. Id. (Donohue, J., dissenting) (describing Consumer Advocacy Group court’s
analysis regarding voter ballot initiative).
132. See id. (Donohue, J., dissenting) (summarizing Consumer Advocacy Grp.
court’s reliance on voter pamphlets in determining meaning of ambiguous phrases
in California voter ballot initiative); supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text
(discussing Consumer Advocacy Grp. court’s analysis).
133. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1151 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (describing differences
between Consumer Advocacy Grp. decision and present case).
134. See id. at 1146-48 (failing to analyze statutory history and barely examining statutory purpose).
135. See id. at 1145 (discussing how one would perceive stop of “release” of
contaminant if initial discharge was stopped).
136. See id. at 1152 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (noting lack of term “initial” and
“release” in Clean Streams Law).
137. See id. at 1145 (failing to legally analyze why Consumer Advocacy Grp.
court’s reading is most “natural” reading available).
138. Consumer Advocacy Grp. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 454,
459 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (determining purpose of California voter ballot initiative
by examining voter pamphlets given to voters at polling places).
139. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection’s Reply Brief at 19-23, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128
(Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (arguing statutory purpose of remediating polluted
streams furthers water-to-water continuing violation reading); Dernbach, supra
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hue’s position, it alone does not suggest such a powerful strict liability system.140 Examination of the legislative history of Section 605,
the civil penalties provision, leads to the opposite conclusion because “continued violation[s]” were once explicitly discussed in Section 605 prior to a 1976 amendment.141 This suggests the General
Assembly would have kept an extensive continuing violation theory
in Section 605 had it intended for such a reading.142
Accounting for this conflict between statutory purpose and history regarding the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, the court’s reliance on Consumer Advocacy Grp. court was improper, and a different
approach must be taken.143 A second area to examine extensively is
the canon of statutory interpretation known as in pari materia, which
examines the meaning of an ambiguous statute when read in light
of statutes concerning a similar issue.144 The theory that Section
301 of the Clean Streams Law explicitly concerns initial discharges
and implicitly suggests remediation falters when reading other statutes that explicitly discuss stream pollution remediation.145 In particular, the Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation
Standards Act (“Act 2”) explicitly addresses the remedial standards

note 55, at 156-58 (describing purpose of Clean Streams Law as elimination of all
water pollution).
140. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1147 (acknowledging importance of clean environment while refusing to enforce interpretation of Clean Streams Law not explicitly
stated in statutory text).
141. See H. Leg. Journal, at 2751, Section 605 (July 15, 1970) (stating civil
penalties may not exceed $10,000 plus $500 for “each day of continued violation”);
1976 Pa. Laws 1099 (stating amendments which remove “continued violation” language and bring Section 605 to modern state); Brief for Appellee Eqt Production
Company at 19-21, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa.
2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (arguing legislative history of Section 605 indicates DEP’s
continuing violation theory is not intended by General Assembly).
142. Brief for Appellee Eqt Production Company at 19-20, EQT Prod. Co. v.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (stating DEP’s
interpretation is incorrect because General Assembly has demonstrated ability to
explicitly add continuing violations in Clean Streams Law but chose to remove
continuing violations in 1976).
143. Consumer Advocacy Group, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d at 458-61 (using voter ballot
pamphlets to determine purpose of voter ballot initiative and meaning of ambiguous words “discharge” and “release”).
144. See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1972) (explaining
in pari materia as construing several statutes together to determine meaning of ambiguous statute); Brief for Appellee Eqt Production Company at 47-48, EQT Prod.
Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (advancing similar argument using in pari materia to argue Section 301 does not contemplate remediation).
145. See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6026.102(4) (1989) (stating policy of Act 2
as remediation of environmental pollution).
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for pollution clean-up.146 As the majority emphasized, EQT had no
bearing on the potency of the DEP’s ability to levy sanctions under
specific remedial statutes.147 It could then be established that Act
2’s ambit is remediation and Section 301 of the Clean Streams Law
only concerns initial discharges.148
Although the dissent did not directly address this, Justice Donohue appeared to suggest that the Clean Streams Law contemplated a different type of remediation than the general remediation
standard addressed by Act 2.149 Justice Donohue explained the statute appeared to demand polluters halt their contaminants’ flow
once pollution occurred.150 Yet this reading presupposes a potential polluter could suspend the natural passive flow of contaminants
— a feat which would require the damming of rivers and
streams.151 If non-governmental entities could practically dam polluted rivers, erecting a quick but unpermitted damming construction, as demonstrated in Sasser, would ironically lead to a violation
of federal law.152 This logically leaves hunting each molecular contaminant flowing throughout the many waters of Pennsylvania as
the only legal option available to polluters.153 Even if entities
launched this microscopic and preposterous hot pursuit, the Gen146. See id. § 6026.301(a) (discussing standards established by Act 2); id.
§ 6026.106(a) (stating Act 2 remediation standards must be met under Clean
Streams Law).
147. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1148 (describing other avenues of remediation
available to DEP).
148. EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128, 1148 (Pa. 2018)
(arguing both Clean Streams Law and Act 2 as remediation statutes defeats legislative intent of General Assembly).
149. See id. at 1151 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (indicating Clean Streams Law
encourages polluters to limit flow of contaminants once contaminants enter
water); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection’s Reply Brief at 4, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa.
2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (arguing Clean Streams Law was partially intended to
punish entities who failed to remediate existing pollution).
150. See id. at 1152 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (stating “continu[ing] . . . to
permit to flow” language can only be read to prohibit flow of contaminants to any
waters of Commonwealth).
151. See Brief for Appellee Eqt Production Company at 33, EQT Prod. Co. v.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (stating technical infeasibility of damming waterways in order to halt passive migration of
contaminants).
152. See Sasser v. Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 990 F.2d 127, 129
(4th Cir. 1993) (holding violations of CWA occur when unpermitted construction
is erected in body of water).
153. See Brief for Appellee Eqt Production Company at 33, EQT Prod. Co. v.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128 (Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (stating technical infeasibility of damming waterways in order to halt passive migration of
contaminants).
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eral Assembly would not reasonably prescribe these vain indefatigable efforts.154 The cost of tracking down every contaminant among
the numerous tributaries the water-to-water theory contemplates
would be enormous and far outweigh the damage the diluted and
microscopic contaminants incur.155
Extending from this reasoning, one could borrow from tort
doctrine, where environmental law was once mainly practiced, to
further explain why the majority’s interpretation is the “most natural.”156 Using elements of a tort negligence claim to explain the
majority’s decision, polluters whose contaminants passively migrate
far downstream would probably not owe a legal duty to those downstream entities.157 This is because, as previously mentioned, the expense of remediating this far-traveled pollution would be colossal
compared to the injury that pollution incurred.158 Similarly, there
might not be sufficient proximate cause for a negligence action because the downstream contaminants may be too attenuated from
their source.159 A tort negligence action based upon a water-towater theory would therefore fail.160 Given the majority’s explicit
refusal to create strict liability out of the situation, downstream
plaintiffs would be unable to recover damages.161 This reasoning,
154. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1147 (stating General Assembly would have explicitly codified massive strict liability system if it intended to create one).
155. See id. at 1143 (noting complexity of water systems).
156. See Latham, supra note 2, at 750 (discussing how tort law had been traditionally used to remedy environmental harms before statutory pollution control).
157. See id. at 753 (discussing classic elements necessary to prove negligence
in environmental context).
158. See id. at 752 (stating how risk of harm to another party must be found
unreasonable). See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (discussing calculus of negligence used in determining
existence of legal duty). But see United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1031,
1038 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (making similar great cost of remediation versus violation
argument unsuccessfully before federal district court).
159. See Latham, supra note 2, at 750 (noting environmental tort actions fail
when cause is highly attenuated from plaintiff). The EQT court established that
factual or “but-for” cause existed in the case. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1146 (using
strict but-for test to determine that EQT’s conduct led to downstream pollution at
issue in case). See generally Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 211-13 (1866)
(explaining legal principle severing tortfeasor from liability from remote harm
caused by tortfeasor’s negligence in context of house fire chain).
160. See Latham, supra note 2, at 752 (stating court must find risk of harm to
another party unreasonable for duty of care to arise).
161. See id. at 753 (discussing elements necessary to prove negligence in environmental context). But see Alcoa, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 1039 (ruling against party who
argued passive conduct in soil-to-water context should not lead to continuing liability because remediation expenses would greatly outweigh direct costs of violation); Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic Injury,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1444-59 (2005) (discussing limitations of tort doctrine in
rectifying and deterring environmental injuries).
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which likely affected the majority’s general perception of the Clean
Streams Law, is a potential explanation of why the majority chose
the Consumer Advocacy Grp. court’s interpretation as the “most natural” reading of the Clean Streams Law.162
V. THE IMPACT

EQT V. DEP ON ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION
CLEAN STREAMS LAW JURISPRUDENCE

OF

AND

Perceived fallout arising from EQT v. DEP mainly concerns the
DEP’s ability to levy penalties against entities who pollute the Commonwealth’s waters.163 Some who support the DEP’s interpretation
of the Clean Streams Law expressed the fear that, should EQT’s
argument succeed, the DEP could only punish violators of the
Clean Streams Law $10,000 for disastrous one-day spills.164 Under
this prediction, EQT v. DEP would lead to a significantly underfunded DEP, unable to remediate stream pollution.165 This belief is correct in the sense that the DEP would only be able to use
Section 301 of the Clean Streams Law to fine violators $10,000.166
Fortunately, the DEP can also use alternative statutes to impose
sanctions against those who engage in sudden and potent pollution.167 For example, the one-day spill that led to a $7,350,000 settlement agreement with Norfolk Southern used not only the Clean
Streams Law, but also the Solid Waste Management Act and the
162. See EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128, 1145-46 (Pa.
2018) (finding Consumer Advocacy Grp. court’s interpretation of “release” in environmental context to be natural based on general perceptions of word).
163. See, e.g., Brief for Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 7, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d
1128 (Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (discussing how using EQT’s reading of Clean
Streams Law would hamper DEP’s ability to levy sanctions against polluters).
164. See id. (stating one-day polluters cannot be fined more than $10,000 using EQT’s reading); David E. Hess, Will Gas Drilling Company Overturn the Way DEP
Has Calculated Penalties for Nearly 40 Years? We’ll See, PA ENVTL. DIGEST BLOG (May
12, 2017, 6:13 AM), http://paenvironmentdaily.blogspot.com/2017/05/will-drilling-company-overturn-way-dep.html (expressing concern regarding raising
remediation costs without DEP’s water-to-water reading).
165. See Brief for Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 7, EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 181 A.3d 1128
(Pa. 2018) (No. 6 MAP 2017) (using 2006 Norfolk Southern disaster as example).
166. See id. (expressing concern over EQT’s interpretation of Clean Steams
Law regarding raising remedial funds).
167. See, e.g., Department’s Response Memorandum of Law to Norfolk Southern’s Motion and Supporting Memorandum of Law for Partial Summary Judgment
to Strike the Department’s Imposition of Pre-calculated Daily Civil Penalties for
Prospective Violations of Law at 3-4, Norfolk S. Corp. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Pa.
Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 27, 2007) (No. 2006-229-CP-R) (alleging ongoing damages
of $46,420 per day using Clean Streams Law and $3,475,000 using Solid Waste
Management Act and Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act).
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Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act to impose fines.168 The DEP additionally exercised an informal cap on civil penalty claims for imposing
Section 301 violations once Act 2 remediation standards had been
met, so the realistic impact of EQT v. DEP regarding remediation
funds may be minimal.169
EQT v. DEP may also affect future arguments concerning the
soil-to-water theory promoted by the DEP but not currently addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.170 The soil-to-water
theory would charge additional violations every time a contaminant
passively entered the water from polluted soil and, using a reasonableness tort doctrine analysis, may fare better than the water-towater theory.171 It would be more reasonable, theoretically, to expect polluters to remove slow moving contaminants in soil than
from quickly moving contaminants found in various turbulent rivers and tributaries.172 Unfortunately for this theory’s proponents,
the court’s holding effectively spells doom for such an interpretation.173 The Consumer Advocacy Grp. case the majority praised as
finding the “most natural” interpretation of clean water legislation
specifically involved the passive migration of contaminants through
the soil.174 While the court fell short of adopting Consumer Advocacy
Grp.’s reasoning as law, soil-to-water proponents still must comport
their theory with the court’s definition of release as movement
168. See id. (using Solid Waste Management Act and Hazardous Sites Cleanup
Act in attempt to impose multi-million-dollar liability). The DEP justified its sanctions under various laws other than the Clean Streams Law, including the Solid
Waste Management Act and Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act. Id.; 37 PA. BULL. 6340
(Dec. 1, 2007) (alleging damages based upon Solid Waste Management Act and
Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act in addition to Clean Streams Law); 38 PA. BULL. 939
(Feb. 16, 2008) (noting proposed settlement agreement was accepted by Norfolk
Southern). See Paul & Shepard, supra note 56, at 890 (stating several other statutes
that may be used to penalize water polluters).
169. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1147 n.21 (discussing DEP’s informal practice which
limited sanctions once Act 2 standards were met).
170. See id. at 1149 (declining to address soil-to-water theory because issue not
fully argued before court).
171. See United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1039 (N.D. Ind.
2000) (holding entity liable using soil-to-water continuing violation theory similar
to one argued by DEP).
172. See, e.g., Consumer Advocacy Grp. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 128 Cal. Rptr.
2d 454, 456-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (noting contaminants left by Exxon remained
in soil for at least four years).
173. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1144 (finding release as movement from confinement to no confinement as natural reading of Clean Streams Law). Contra EQT,
181 A.3d at 1149 (stating nothing in majority’s opinion should act as disapproval
of soil-to-water theory).
174. Consumer Advocacy Grp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 456-57 (discussing Exxon’s
alleged pollution via passive movement of particles through soil).
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from a place of confinement to one of no confinement.175 Proponents might suggest the soil is a place of confinement, but this argument is tenuous — contaminants in soil are not confined, they
simply move slowly.176 Under this precedent, a soil-to-water theory
is unlikely to succeed.177
Defenders of the DEP’s previous practice may find consolation
in the court’s unceremonious but apparent rejection of the unitary
waters theory.178 While the court did not explicitly name the unitary waters theory, the court rejected EQT’s argument that the
Clean Streams Law views all of the waters in the Commonwealth as
one.179 The court also failed to overturn Harmar Coal, which directly conflicts with the unitary waters theory by forbidding the unpermitted transfer of polluted water from one polluted source to a
pristine water body.180 Although the court did not charge additional violations of the Clean Streams Law when contaminants entered new bodies of water, they did this in a way which did not
support the unitary waters theory.181 The court instead focused on
the release of contaminants rather than the waters themselves,
avoiding what the First Circuit called an “irrational result.”182 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision will provide clarity to both
175. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1146 (holding Clean Streams Law only concerns initial
releases).
176. See, e.g., Consumer Advocacy Grp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 457 (describing contaminants found in soil as “passive[ly] migrat[ing]”).
177. EQT, 181 A.3d at 1146 (emphasizing Clean Streams Law applies to initial
releases).
178. See id. (disagreeing with EQT’s argument regarding all waters in Commonwealth as one).
179. Id. at 1145-46 (finding waters of the Commonwealth a defined term and
rejecting EQT’s argument that Clean Streams Law treats all waters in Commonwealth as one).
180. See id. at 1148 (failing to overturn Harmar Coal); Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308, 315 (Pa. 1973) (charging additional violations of
clean water legislation when entity pollutes pristine water with contaminated water
already in environment). The EQT court indicated Harmar Coal was only inapposite and not overturned. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1148 (validating Harmar Coal). See
also Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding transfer of water between water bodies constitutes “discharge” in context of Clean Water Act).
181. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1146-47 (avoiding unitary waters theory and focusing analysis instead on release of contaminants rather than waters themselves).
182. Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1297 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting unitary waters theory because transferring water between polluted water
bodies and pristine water bodies allows for irrational result); see EQT, 181 A.3d at
1146-47 (focusing analysis on release of contaminants rather than their subsequent
entrance into new waterways). Compare Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009) (rejecting continuing violation
theory by holding CWA views all discrete waters as one).
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potential polluters who are concerned with uncertainty regarding
liability under the Clean Streams Law and to those who wish to ascertain the court’s unitary waters theory jurisprudence.183
Christopher Regan*
183. See EQT, 181 A.3d at 1145-46 (rejecting argument stating that Clean
Streams Law views all waters in Commonwealth as one).
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.S., Biology, 2017, University of Pittsburgh. I would like to thank University of
Pittsburgh Literature Professor Michael West. Realizing I lacked the writing acumen for law school with my science background, Professor West spent much of his
free time in the summer of 2017 schooling me in grammar and style. I had already
graduated from the University of Pittsburgh, and he was free from any obligation
to teach me anything. This did not deter him. I admire Professor West for his
humor and selflessness. As for you, Professor, I hope this paper is satisfactory and
devoid of “gross errors.”
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